A SELECTION OF REACTIONS TO MLADIC’S ARREST

By The Associated Press – May 26, 2011

Here is a selection of quotes in response to the arrest Thursday of Ratko Mladic, the top Bosnian Serb general during the 1992-95 Bosnian war who was wanted for genocide and other war crimes.

“An important moment for the Mothers of Srebrenica.” Statement from 6,000 women who lost relatives in the 1995 massacre, through their lawyers in Amsterdam.

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“Today is an important day for the families of Mladic’s many victims, for Serbia, for Bosnia, for the United States, and for international justice. While we will never be able to bring back those who were murdered, Mladic will now have to answer to his victims, and the world, in a court of law. … On this important day, we recommit ourselves to supporting ongoing reconciliation efforts in the Balkans and to working to prevent future atrocities. Those who have committed crimes against humanity and genocide will not escape judgment.” — President Barack Obama, from the G-8 summit.

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“President Karadzic is sorry for Gen. Mladic’s loss of freedom and he looks forward to working with him to bring out the truth about what happened in Bosnia.” — wartime Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic, who is on trial for genocide, through his lawyer in The Hague to the AP.

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“This is an historic day for international justice. This arrest marks an important step in our collective fight against impunity.” — U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, during a visit to Paris.

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“Mladic will finally be held accountable — to Bosnia and the world. … Once again, we have seen that crimes against humanity will not escape the long arm of justice. His arrest also should allow the people of Serbia to take an important step toward integration into Europe and the international community.” — Former U.S. President Bill Clinton, in a statement.

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“I’ve always found it difficult to believe that the Serbian security people didn’t know where he was.” — Richard Goldstone, the prosecutor who indicted Mladic and Karadzic in 1995, by telephone to the AP.

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“These victims have endured unimaginable horrors — including the genocide in Srebrenica — and redress for their suffering is long overdue. … We believe that it can have a positive impact on reconciliation in the region.” — Serge Brammertz, chief prosecutor of the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal, in a statement.

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“Ratko Mladic deserves to be tried and convicted. He was the military commander who ordered the murder of thousands and attempted to destroy Bosnian society. His trial should teach again the grim reality of ethnic cleansing and, I hope, bring some comfort to those who survived. … Mladic tried to become a conquering hero. Instead, he lived as a fugitive in obscurity and now faces years in custody. Justice works.” — former U.S Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, who was ambassador to the U.N. during the Bosnian war.

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“This is a huge moment for the principle that people who engage in genocide will eventually be brought to justice, but also for Serbia. …It’s an interesting example too of the way that Europe and the prospect of European Union membership can act as a magnet for changing the behavior of countries, changing their political system. So it’s big news and good news.” — Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, on Britain’s Channel 4 News.

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“The European perspective for Serbia is brighter than it has been before. A very important condition that we’ve had is that they cooperate fully with the war crimes tribunal in The Hague. The arrest of first Karadzic and now Mladic show that they are complying with this demand.” — Carl Bildt, Swedish foreign minister and former peace negotiator for Bosnia, by telephone to the AP.

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“In the end people get chased, prosecuted and finally get put away. And justice will triumph. And again, in that sense, this is a special moment for very many people.” — Prime Minister Mark Rutte of the Netherlands, whose U.N. battalion was overrun by Mladic’s troops at Srebrenica in 1995.

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“NATO has been a guarantor of security in the Balkans for the best part of two decades and today we have seen an important step toward a Europe that is whole, free and at peace. … We remain committed to assisting the whole region.” — NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, in a statement.

To see the rest of reactions, please visit the AP website.

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KEY FIGURES OF ICTY CASES June 03, 2011

THE TRIBUNAL HAS INDICTED 161 PERSONS

FUGITIVE: GORAN HADŽIĆ

For serious violations of international humanitarian law Committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia

Goran Hadzic–still at large!!!

Click here to see the PDF.

Document prepared by the Communications Service.
Updated 03/06/2011

ICTY TRAVESTY

This is a review of Germinal Chivikov’s book Srebrenica: The Star Witness (orig. Srebrenica: Der Kronzeuge, 2009, transl. by John Laughland, Srebrenica Historical Project, 2010, 164 pp.) – “a devastating indictment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).”

P.S.: I will post all 164 pages eventually, so come back later…

Erdemović, Dražen

The book shows that the Tribunal “does not behave according to the traditions of the rule of law”–it is a political rather than judicial institution, and has played this political role well. It is not the first work to effectively assail the Tribunal—Laughland’s own book Travesty (Pluto: 2006), and Michael Mandel’s How America Gets Away With Murder (Pluto: 2004) are powerful critiques. But Civikov’s book is unique in its intensive and very effective focus on a single witness, Drazen Erdemovic, and the ICTY’s prosecutors and judges handling of that witness. Erdemovic was the prosecution’s “star witness,” the only one in the trials of various Serb military and political figures to have claimed actual participation in a massacre of Bosnian Muslim prisoners. It is therefore of great interest and importance that Civikov is able to show very convincingly that this key witness was a charlatan, fraud, and mercenary, and that the ICTY’s prosecutors and judges effectively conspired to allow this witness’s extremely dubious and contradictory claims to be accepted without verification or honest challenge.
Erdemovic was a member of a Bosnian Serb military unit, the “10th Sabotage Unit,” an eight-man team of which he claimed shot to death 1,200 Bosnian Muslim prisoners at Branjevo Farm north of Srebrenica in Bosnia on July 16, 1995. Erdemovic confessed to having personally killed 70-100 prisoners. He was initially arrested by Yugoslav authorities on March 3, 1996, and quickly indicted, but was turned over to the ICTY at pressing U.S. and ICTY official request on March 30, 1996, supposedly temporarily, but in fact, permanently. He was himself eventually tried, convicted, and served three and a half years in prison for his crimes. This was a rather short term for an acknowledged killer of 70-100 prisoners, but longer than he had anticipated when he agreed to testify for the ICTY—he had expected complete immunity, as he told Le Figaro reporter Renaud Girard (“Bosnia: Confession of a War Criminal, “ Le Figaro, March 8, 1996). He claimed to have an agreement with the ICTY whereby “in return for his evidence he will be allowed to settle in a Western country with his family. He will enter the box as a witness, not as an accused, and will thus escape all punishment.” But his earlier arrest, indictment and publicity in Yugoslavia may have made some prison term necessary for the ICTY’s credibility. He ended up after his prison term in an unknown location as a “protected witness” of the ICTY. But even before his own sentencing he had begun his role as star witness in the ICTY’s (and U.S. and NATO’s) trials of accused Serbs. He appeared in five such trials, and from beginning to end was taken as a truth-teller by prosecutors, judges, and the mainstream media.

One of the most remarkable and revealing features of the Erdemovic case is that although he named seven individuals who did the killing with him, and two superiors in the chain of command who ordered or failed to stop the crime, not one of these was ever brought into an ICTY court either as an accused killer or to confirm any of Erdemovic’s claims. These co-killers have lived quietly, within easy reach of ICTY jurisdiction, but untroubled by that institution and any demands seemingly imposed by a rule of law. The commander of his unit, Milorad Pelemis, who Erdemovic claimed had given the order to kill, made it clear in an interview published in a Belgrade newspaper in November 2005, that the Hague investigators have never questioned him. He had never gone into hiding, but has lived undisturbed with his wife and children in Belgrade. Nor have ICTY investigators bothered with Brano Gojkovic, a private in the killer team who Erdemovic claimed was somehow in immediate command of the unit (a point never explained by him or prosecutors or judges). Civikov points out that only once did the judges in any of the five trials in which the star witness testified ask the prosecutors whether they were investigating these other killers. The prosecutors assured the judges in 1996 that the others were being investigated, but 14 years later the Office of the Prosecutor had not questioned one of them. And from 1996 onward the judges never came back to the subject.

As these seven were killers of many hundreds in Erdemovic’s version, and the prosecutors and judges took Erdemovic’s version as true, why were these killers left untouched? One thing immediately clear is that the ICTY was not in the business of serving impartial justice even to the point of arresting and trying wholesale killers of Bosnian Muslims in a case the ICTY itself called “genocide.” But ignoring the co-perpetrators in this case strongly suggests that the prosecutors and judges were engaged in a political project—protecting a witness who would say what the ICTY wanted said, and refusing to allow any contesting evidence or cross-examination that would discredit the star witness. Civikov points out that the only time Erdemovic was subject to serious cross-examination was when he was questioned by Milosevic himself during the marathon Milosevic trial. And Civikov shows well that the ICTY presiding judge in that case, Richard May, went to great pains to stop Milosevic whenever his questions penetrated too deeply into the area of Erdemovic’s connections or credibility.

In April 2004, a Bosnian Croat, Marko Boskic, was arrested in Peabody, Massachusetts, for having caused a hit-and-run car crash while drunk. It was soon discovered that Boskic was one of the members of Erdemovic’s killer team at Branjevo Farm. But journalists at the ICTY soon discovered that the Tribunal did not intend to ask for the extradition of this accused and confessed murderer. A spokesman for the Office of the Prosecutor stated on August 2004 that the prosecutor was not applying for the extradition of Boskic because it was obligated to concentrate on “the big fish.” So killing hundreds, and being part of a “joint criminal enterprise” murdering 1,200, does not yield big enough fish for the ICTY. In fact, this is a major lie as dozens of cases have been brought against Serbs for small-scale killings or even just beatings, and the ICTY has thrived on little fish for many years. In fact, the first case ever brought by the ICTY was against one Dusko Tadic in 1996, who was charged with a dozen killings, all dismissed for lack of evidence, leaving him guilty of no killings whatsoever, but only of persecution and beatings, for which he was given a 20 year sentence. A number of other Serbs were given prison sentences, not for killing people, but for beatings or passivity in not exercising authority to constrain underlings (e.g., Dragolic Prcac, 5 years; Milojica Kos, 6 years, Mlado Radic, 20 years, among others). The dossier of ICTY prosecution of little (Serb) fish is large.

Thus, the Boskic case does not fall into any little-fish-disinterest category. Rather, it is perfectly consistent with the failure to bring to court Pelermis or any of the seven known co-perpetrators of the massacre. Civikov’s very plausible hypothesis is that this is another manifestation of star witness protection—the ICTY does not want his convenient testimony to be challenged. Little fish like Boskic might gum up a political project. Civikov contrasts the extremely alert and aggressive actions of the ICTY and U.S. authorities in getting Erdemovic transferred to the Hague in March 1996 with this remarkable reluctance to even question Erdemovic’s fellow killers. He was seen quickly as a man who might make proper connections to enemy targets, so no holds were barred then, or later..

Another remarkable feature of the handling of Erdemovic is his use as a star witness immediately after he had been declared mentally impaired and before his own sentencing. Following his first confession of guilt on May 31, 1996, on June 27, 1996 Erdemovic was declared by his trial judges to be unfit for questioning in his own sentencing hearing because psychiatrists found him to be suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, the doctors urging a pre-hearing review of his mental condition in six to nine months time. But on July 5th, little more than a week after this medical report, Erdemovic was put forward as the star witness in a pre-trial hearing to publicize the current allegations against Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.

This was a remarkable spectacle. The two accused had not been apprehended, so they were not present to defend themselves, nor were their attorneys. It was only the prosecutors and ICTY judges in action. The same judges who had just declared him mentally unfit for questioning in his own hearing now pushed him forward without any further medical examination. The presiding judge Claude Jorda explained that Erdemovic’s own trial and sentencing were postponed “because we have asked for some further medical information,” which suppresses the fact that the judgment of the doctors was that Erdemovic was “unfit to be questioned,” presumably not just in his own trial. But Jorda’s service to the political project runs deeper—he not only allows the Prosecutor to put on the stand a just-declared medically unfit person, and does this before this self-admitted murderer is sentenced, he even assures Erdemovic that his evidence as a witness for the prosecution “might be taken into consideration.” It was mainly on the basis of unverified and unchallenged (and unchallengeable) testimony of this sick man and mass killer still facing his own trial and sentencing, that arrest warrants were issued for Karadzic and Mladic.

What Erdemovic was prepared to do in service to the ICTY program was to help build the case that there was a line of command between himself and his co-murderers at Branjevo Farm and the Bosnian Serb high command, i.e., Karadzic and Mladic, and hopefully eventually Milosevic. He did this poorly, never showing those leaders’ involvement in or knowledge of this killing expedition, but mainly just asserting that its local commanders were under the authority of central Bosnian Serb headquarters. He claimed that immediate authority over the killing operation was held by Brano Gojkovic, a private in a team that also included a Lieutenant, and he mentions a mysterious and unnamed Lieutenant Colonel who took the unit to the killing site and then left. Erdemovic is not consistent on whether Pelermis ordered the killing or this unnamed Lieutenant Colonel. He also asserts that Colonel Petar Salpura, an intelligence officer of the Bosnian Serb army had direct command responsibility for the massacre. He vacillates on Gojkovic’s power, sometimes making him “commander” with great authority, sometimes merely serving as an intermediary. Erdemovic himself was allegedly without authority and coerced into killing, but Civikov makes a very good case that at that time Erdemovic was a sergeant, and that he had joined the team voluntarily. But he and a Lieutenant Franc Kos were supposedly bossed by private Gojkovic in this killing enterprise. This line of command is very messy!

Civikov shows that the prosecution and judges strove mightily and successfully to prevent any challenges to Erdemovic’s implausible and contradictory, and partly disprovable, claims about the line of command. This includes, importantly, their refusal to call before the court even one of those “little fish” co-murderers and higher commanders who might have clarified the facts. Instead of calling to the stand his boss, Lieutenant Pelermis, or Pelermis’s boss, Colonel Petar Salpura, the ICTY is happy to stop with “a psychologically disturbed and apparently demoted sergeant,” who makes the ties that this court is pursuing with undue diligence.

Erdemovic and a number of his colleagues in the .10th Sabotage Unit were clearly mercenaries, and after the ending of the Balkan wars served the French in Africa. Erdemovic himself had worked for a time with the Bosnian Muslim army, then with the Croatians, and then with the Bosnian Serbs. He was trained as a locksmith, but never managed to work that trade. He found military service, and eventually serving as a star (and protected) witness, more profitable, but he regularly claimed before the Tribunal that he was a good man, hated war, was coerced into participating in the Branjevo Farm mass murder, and confessed to his crimes there because he was a man of conscience. The ICTY judges believed him, never saw him as a mercenary despite his performing military service for all three parties in the Bosnian warfare, and the ICTY took pains to exclude any witnesses from testifying who would put him in a bad light. They could not avoid several awkward witnesses in other trials: Colonel Salpura, a defence witness in the Blagovic and Jokic trials, denied authority over the 10th Sabotage Unit, and gave clear evidence that the killer team was on holiday leave on July 16, 1995; Dragan Todorovic, a witness for the prosecution in the Popovic case and officer of the Drina Corp of the Bosnian Serb army, also testified that the killer unit was on leave, that Lieutenant Kos, not private Gojkovic, signed out for the arms to be used by the unit, and that Erdemovic volunteered to be a member of that unit, and was not coerced into joining it.

Except for these awkward witnesses, the prosecutors and judges were able to keep out of the court record the fact that the Erdemovic unit that went to the Branjevo Farm did so during a ten-day vacation leave, not during regular service hours. Erdemovic himself never mentioned this fact. They also successfully buried the fact that, according to an early interview with Erdemovic, he claimed that his colleagues received a large sum of gold, perhaps 12 kilos, for some kind of service rendered. This payment, which suggests mercenary service, and not payment by the Bosnian Serb army, was never explored by prosecutors or judges in any of the trials in which Erdemovic participated, and was only raised by Milosevic, who, as noted, was harshly limited in his questioning by Judge Richard May. The facts that members of the killing group were on leave on July 16, 1995, and later findings of a French secret service connection of Pelemis and several of his colleagues, and the subsequent recruitment of soldiers from the 10th Sabotage Unit for mercenary service in Zaire to fight in the war there on the side of Mobutu, are suggestive. So is the fact that this mass murder of prisoners was extremely unhelpful to the Bosnian Serb cause, but worked out very well for the NATO powers. And it is clear why the ICTY, in service to NATO, would refuse to explore these questions and linkages.

The protection of Erdemovic and the notable ICTY-NATO success in getting his problematic testimony accepted as truth in five separate trials of Serbs owes much to the media, which in the United States and Britain raised no questions and swallowed the party line intact (for a case study, see Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, “Marlise Simons on the Yugoslavia Tribunal: A Study in Total Propaganda Service,” ZNet, 2004). This applied not just to the mainstream media but to the supposedly left and dissident media, with only Z Magazine in the United States publishing reviews of serious critical works dealing with the ICTY (notably, Mandel, Laughland and Johnstone).

Germinal Civikov points out that killing 1,200 people in five hours, ten at a batch, as claimed by Erdemovic, would allow under three minutes for each batch, including getting them out of the buses, taking them to the shooting zone, shooting them, making sure of their being dead, and disposing of the bodies. There were also claimed interludes of drinking, arguing, and cavorting. Why did the prosecutors, judges and media never address this issue of timing? Why did the prosecutor sometimes speak of only “hundreds” killed at the Branjevo Farm? Could it be related to the fact that fewer than 200 bodies were recovered from the site, and no aerial photos were ever produced that showed body removal or reburial? Civikov says, “So something between 100 and 900? This lack of knowledge, incidentally, will not prevent the judges, several months later, from putting the figure of 1,200 in their judgment after all—mind you without any proof, then or now, apart from the accused’s own claim.” Once again, why did they not call any other perpetrator to discuss numbers?

One would love to know what the ICTY prosecutors and judges said behind the scenes in confronting Erdemovic’s numbers, lines of authority, role, lies and contradictions. Perhaps the ICTY insiders did discuss them, but they and the media have played dumb. A Wikileaks was, and still is today, desperately needed to deal with the Erdemovic/ICTY travesty—and in fact, a Wikileaks on the ICTY would wreak havoc in the trial of Karadzic and pursuit of Mladic.

P.S.: Please share this with others so we can expose (and hopefully embarrass) The Tribunal, so it starts working according to the traditions of the rule of law, no more, no less!

RADOVAN KARADZIC and RATKO MLADIC INDICTMENT

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
CASE NO.: IT-95-18-I
THE PROSECUTOR OF THE TRIBUNAL
AGAINST
RADOVAN KARADZIC,
RATKO MLADIC
INDICTMENT

Richard J. Goldstone, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
pursuant to his authority under Article 18 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (“The Statute of the Tribunal”), charges
RATKO MLADIC and RADOVAN KARADZIC with GENOCIDE, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY and VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR, as set forth below:
“SAFE AREA” OF SREBRENICA
1. After war erupted in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnian Serb military forces
occupied Bosnian Muslim villages in the eastern part of the country, resulting in an exodus of
Bosnian Muslims to enclaves in Gorazde, Zepa, Tuzla, and Srebrenica. All of the events referred to
in this indictment took place in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2. On 16 April 1993, the Security Council of the United Nations, acting pursuant to Chapter VII of
its Charter, adopted resolution 819, in which it demanded that all parties to the conflict in the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a safe area which
should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act. Resolution 819 was reaffirmed by
Resolution 824 on 6 May 1993 and by Resolution 836 on 4 June 1993.
3. Before the attack by Bosnian Serb forces, as described in this indictment, the estimated Bosnian
Muslim population in the safe area of Srebrenica, was approximately 60,000.

ATTACK ON THE SAFE AREA OF SREBRENICA

4. On or about 6 July 1995, the Bosnian Serb army shelled Srebrenica and attacked United Nations
observation posts that were manned by Dutch soldiers and located in the safe area. The attack on the
Srebrenica safe area by the Bosnian Serb army continued through 11 July 1995, when the first units
of the attacking Bosnian Serb forces entered Srebrenica.
5. The Bosnian Muslim men, women and children who remained in Srebrenica after the beginning
of the Bosnian Serb attack took two courses of action. Several thousand women, children and some
mostly elderly men fled to the UN compound in Potocari, located within the safe area of Srebrenica,
where they sought the protection of the Dutch battalion responsible for the compound. They
remained at the compound from 11 July 1995 until 13 July 1995, when they were all evacuated by
buses and trucks under the control of and operated by Bosnian Serb military personnel.
6. A second group of approximately 15,000 Bosnian Muslim men, with some women and children,
gathered at Susnjari during the evening hours of 11 July 1995 and fled, in a huge column, through
the woods towards Tuzla. Approximately one-third of this group consisted of armed Bosnian
military personnel and armed civilians. The rest were unarmed civilians.

EVENTS IN POTOCARI

7. On 11 July 1995 and 12 July 1995, RATKO MLADIC and members of his staff met in Bratunac
with Dutch military officers and representatives of the Muslim refugees from Potocari. At these
meetings, RATKO MLADIC informed them, among other things, that Bosnian Muslim soldiers
who surrendered their weapons would be treated as prisoners of war according to the Geneva
Conventions and that refugees evacuated from Potocari would not be hurt.
8. On or about 12 July 1995, Bosnian Serb military forces burned and looted Bosnian Muslim
houses in and around Potocari.
9. On or about 12 July 1995, in the morning hours, Bosnian Serb military forces arrived at the UN
military compound in Potocari and its environs.
10. On or about 12 July 1995, RATKO MLADIC arrived in Potocari, accompanied by his military
aides and a television crew. He falsely and repeatedly told Bosnian Muslims in and around Potocari
that they would not be harmed and that they would be safely transported out of Srebrenica.
11. On or about 12 July 1995, at the direction and in the presence of RATKO MLADIC,
approximately 50-60 buses and trucks arrived near the UN military compound in Potocari. Shortly
after the arrival of these vehicles, the evacuation process of Bosnian Muslim refugees started. As
Muslim women, children and men started to board the buses and trucks, Bosnian Serb military
personnel separated the men from the women and children. This selection and separation of Muslim
men took place in the presence of and at the direction of RATKO MLADIC.
12. The Bosnian Muslim men who had been separated from other refugees were taken to divers
locations in and around Potocari. On or about 12 July 1995, RATKO MLADIC and Bosnian Serb
military personnel under his command, informed some of these Muslim men that they would be
evacuated and exchanged for Bosnian Serbs being held in Tuzla.
13. Most of the Muslim men who had been separated from the other refugees in Potocari were
transported to Bratunac and then to the area of Karakaj, where they were massacred by Bosnian
Serb military personnel.
14. Between 12 July 1995 and 13 July 1995, Bosnian Serb military personnel summarily executed
Bosnian Muslim men and women at divers locations around the UN compound where they had
taken refuge. The bodies of those summarily executed were left in fields and buildings in the
immediate vicinity of the compound. These arbitrary killings instilled such terror and panic amongst
the Muslims remaining there that some of them committed suicide and all the others agreed to leave
the enclave.
15. The evacuation of all able-bodied Muslim refugees concluded on 13 July 1995. As a result of the
Bosnian Serb attack on the safe area and other actions, the Muslim population of the enclave of
Srebrenica was virtually eliminated by Bosnian Serb military personnel.

SURRENDER AND EXECUTIONS

16. Between the evening of 11 July 1995 and the morning of 12 July 1995, the huge column of
Muslims which had gathered in Susnjari fled Srebrenica through the woods towards Tuzla.
17. Bosnian Serb military personnel, supported by armoured personnel carriers, tanks, anti-aircraft
guns and artillery, positioned themselves along the Bratunac – Milici road in an effort to interdict the
column of Bosnian Muslims fleeing towards Tuzla.
18. As soon as the column reached Bosnian Serb held territory in the vicinity of Buljim, Bosnian
Serb military forces attacked it. As a result of this and other attacks by Bosnian Serb military forces,
many Muslims were killed and wounded and the column divided into several smaller parts which
continued towards Tuzla. Approximately one-third of the column, mostly composed of military
personnel, crossed the Bratunac-Milici road near Nova Kasaba and reached safety in Tuzla. The
remaining Muslims were trapped behind the Bosnian Serb lines.
19. Thousands of Muslims were captured by or surrendered to Bosnian Serb military forces under
the command and control of RATKO MLADIC and RADOVAN KARADZIC. Many of the
Muslims who surrendered did so because they were assured that they would be safe if they
surrendered. In many instances, assurances of safety were provided to the Muslims by Bosnian Serb
military personnel who were with other Bosnian Serb soldiers wearing stolen UN uniforms, and by
Muslims who had been captured and ordered to summon their fellow Muslims from the woods.
20. Many of the Bosnian Muslims who were captured by or surrendered to Bosnian Serb military
personnel were summarily executed by Bosnian Serb military personnel at the locations of their
surrender or capture, or at other locations shortly thereafter. Incidents of such summary executions
include, but are not limited to:
20.1 On or about 13 July 1995, near Nezuk in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a group of
10 Bosnian Muslim men were captured. Bosnian Serb soldiers summarily executed some of these
men, including Mirsad Alispahic and Hajrudin Mesanovic.
20.2 On or about 13 July 1995, on the banks of the Jadar River between Konjevic Polje and
Drinjaca, Bosnian Serb soldiers summarily executed 15 Bosnian Muslim men who had surrendered
or been captured. Amongst those killed were Hamed Omerovic, Azem Mujic and Ismet Ahmetovic.
20.3 On or about 13 July 1995, in the vicinity of Konjevic Polje, Bosnian Serb soldiers summarily
executed hundreds of Muslims, including women and children.
20.4 On or about 17 July 1995 or 18 July 1995, in the vicinity of Konjevic Polje, Bosnian Serb
soldiers captured about 150-200 Bosnian Muslims and summarily executed about one-half of them.
20.5 On or about 18 July 1995 or 19 July 1995, in the vicinity of Nezuk, about 20 groups, each
containing between 5-10 Bosnian Muslim men, surrendered to Bosnian Serb military forces. After
the men surrendered, Bosnian Serb soldiers ordered them to line up and summarily executed them.
20.6 On or about 20 July 1995 or 21 July 1995, near the village of Meces, Bosnian Serb military
personnel, using megaphones, urged Bosnian Muslim men who had fled Srebrenica to surrender and
assured them that they would be safe. Approximately 350 Bosnian Muslim men responded to these
entreaties and surrendered. Bosnian Serb soldiers then took approximately 150 of them, instructed
them to dig their own graves and then summarily executed them.
20.7 On or about 21 July 1995 or 22 July 1995, near the village of Meces, an excavator dug a large
pit and Bosnian Serb soldiers ordered approximately 260 Bosnian Muslim men who had been
captured to stand around the hole. The Muslim men were then surrounded by armed Bosnian Serb
soldiers and ordered not to move or they would be shot. Some of the men moved and were shot. The
remaining men were pushed into the hole and buried alive.
21. Many of the Muslims who surrendered to Bosnian Serb military personnel were not killed at the
locations of their surrender, but instead were transported to central assembly points where Bosnian
Serb soldiers held them under armed guard. These assembly points included, among others, a hangar
in Bratunac; soccer fields in Kasaba, Konjevic Polje, Kravica, and Vlasenica; a meadow behind the
bus station in Sandici and other fields and meadows along the Bratunac – Milici road.
22. Between 12 July 1995 and 14 July 1995, at various of these assembly points, including the
hangar in Bratunac and the soccer stadium in Kasaba, RATKO MLADIC addressed the Bosnian
Muslim detainees. He falsely and repeatedly assured them that they would be safe and that they
would be exchanged for Bosnian Serb prisoners held by Bosnian government forces.
23. Between 12 July 1995 and 14 July 1995, Bosnian Serb military personnel arbitrarily selected
Bosnian Muslim detainees and summarily executed them.

MASS EXECUTIONS NEAR KARAKAJ

24. On or about 14 July 1995, Bosnian Serb military personnel transported thousands of Muslim
detainees from Bratunac, Kravica and other locations to an assembly point in a school complex near
Karakaj. At this assembly point, Bosnian Serb military personnel ordered the Muslim detainees to
take off their jackets, coats and other garments and place them in front of the sports hall. They were
then crowded into the school building and adjacent sports hall and held under armed guard.
25. On or about 14 July 1995, at this school complex near Karakaj, RATKO MLADIC conferred
with his military subordinates and addressed some of the Muslims detained there.
26. At various times during 14 July 1995, Bosnian Serb military personnel killed Bosnian Muslim
detainees at this school complex.
27. Throughout 14 July 1995, Bosnian Serb military personnel removed all the Muslim detainees, in
small groups, from the school building and sports hall and loaded them onto trucks guarded and
driven by Bosnian Serb soldiers. Before boarding the trucks, many of the detainees had their hands
tied behind their backs or were blindfolded. They were then driven to at least two locations in the
vicinity of Karakaj.
28. Once the trucks arrived at these locations, Bosnian Serb military personnel ordered the bound or
blindfolded Muslim detainees off the trucks and summarily executed them. The summary
executions took place from approximately noon to midnight on 14 July 1995.
29. Bosnian Serb military personnel buried the executed Bosnian Muslim men in mass graves near
the execution sites.
30. On or about 14 July 1995, RATKO MLADIC was present at one of the mass execution sites
when Bosnian Serb military personnel summarily executed Bosnian Muslim men.
31. The summary executions of Bosnian Muslim males, which occurred on 14 July 1995 in the
vicinity of Karakaj, resulted in the loss of thousands of lives.

THE ACCUSED

32. RADOVAN KARADZIC was born on 19 June 1945 in the municipality of Savnik of the
Republic of Montenegro. From on or about 13 May 1992 to the present, he has been president of the
Bosnian Serb administration in Pale.
33. RATKO MLADIC was born on 12 March 1943 in Kalinovik municipality of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. He is a career military officer and holds the rank of general in the Bosnian
Serb armed forces. From on or about 14 May 1992 to the present, he has been the commander of the
army of the Bosnian Serb administration.

SUPERIOR AUTHORITY
RADOVAN KARADZIC

34. RADOVAN KARADZIC was a founding member and president of the Serbian Democratic
Party (SDS) of what was then the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The SDS was the
main political party among the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As president of the SDS, he was
and is the most powerful official in the party. His duties as president include representing the party,
co-ordinating the work of party organs and ensuring the realisation of the programmatic tasks and
goals of the party. He continues to hold this post.
35. RADOVAN KARADZIC became the first president of the Bosnian Serb administration in Pale
on or about 13 May 1992. At the time he assumed this position, his de jure powers, as described in
the constitution of the Bosnian Serb administration, included, but were not limited to, commanding
the army of the Bosnian Serb administration in times of war and peace and having the authority to
appoint, promote and discharge officers of the army. As president, he was and is a position of
superior authority to RATKO MLADIC and every member of the Bosnian Serb army and all units
and personnel assigned or attached to the Bosnian Serb army.
36. In addition to his powers described in the constitution, RADOVAN KARADZIC’s powers as
president of the Bosnian Serb administration are augmented by Article 6 of the Bosnian Serb Act on
People’s Defence. This Act vested in him, among other powers, the authority to supervise the
Territorial Defence both in peace and war and the authority to issue orders for the utilisation of the
police in case of war, immediate threat and other emergencies. Article 39 of the same Act
empowered him, in cases of imminent threat of war and other emergencies, to deploy Territorial
Defence units for the maintenance of law and order.
37. RADOVAN KARADZIC’s powers are further augmented by Article 33 of the Bosnian Serb
Act on Internal Affairs, which authorised him to activate reserve police in emergency situations.
38. RADOVAN KARADZIC has exercised the powers described above and has acted and been
dealt with internationally as the president of the Bosnian Serb administration in Pale. In that
capacity, he has, inter alia, participated in international negotiations and has personally made
agreements on such matters as cease-fires and humanitarian relief, and these agreements have been
implemented.

RATKO MLADIC

39. RATKO MLADIC was, in 1991, appointed commander of the 9th Corps of the Yugoslav
People’s Army (JNA) in Knin in the Republic of Croatia. In May 1992, he assumed command of the
forces of the Second Military District of the JNA which then effectively became the Bosnian Serb
army. He holds the rank of general and from about 14 May 1992 to the present, has been the
commander of the army of the Bosnian Serb administration. In that capacity, he was and is in a
position of superior authority to every member of the Bosnian Serb army and all units and personnel
assigned or attached to that army.
40. RATKO MLADIC has demonstrated his control in military matters by negotiating, inter alia,
cease-fire and prisoner exchange agreements; agreements relating to the opening of Sarajevo airport;
agreements relating to access for humanitarian aid convoys; and anti-sniping agreements, all of
which have been implemented.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
41. At all times relevant to this indictment, a state of armed conflict and partial occupation existed in
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
42. In each paragraph charging genocide, a crime recognised by Article 4 of the Statute of the
Tribunal, the alleged acts or omissions were committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, or religious group, as such.
43. In each paragraph charging crimes against humanity, crimes recognised by Article 5 of the
Statute of the Tribunal, the alleged acts or omissions were part of a widespread or systematic or
large-scale attack directed against a civilian population.
44. RATKO MLADIC and RADOVAN KARADZIC are individually responsible for the crimes
alleged against them in this indictment pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Tribunal Statute. Individual
criminal responsibility includes committing, planning, instigating, ordering or otherwise aiding and
abetting in the planning, preparation or execution of any crimes referred to in Articles 2 to 5 of the
Tribunal Statute.
45. RATKO MLADIC and RADOVAN KARADZIC are also, or alternatively, criminally
responsible as commanders for the acts of their subordinates pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Tribunal
Statute. Command criminal responsibility is the responsibility of a superior officer for the acts of his
subordinate if he knew or had reason to know that his subordinate was about to commit such acts or
had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such
acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
46. The general allegations contained in paragraphs 41 through 45 are realleged and incorporated
into each of the charges set forth below.

CHARGES
COUNTS 1-2
(GENOCIDE)
(CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY)

47. Between about 12 July 1995 and 13 July 1995, Bosnian Serb military personnel, under the
command and control of RATKO MLADIC and RADOVAN KARADZIC, arrived in Potocari
where thousands of Muslim men, women and children had sought refuge in and around the UN
military compound. Bosnian Serb military personnel, under the command and control of RATKO
MLADIC and RADOVAN KARADZIC, summarily executed many Bosnian Muslim refugees
who remained in Potocari.
48. Between about 13 July 1995 and 22 July 1995, Bosnian Serb military personnel, under the
command and control of RATKO MLADIC and RADOVAN KARADZIC, summarily executed
many Bosnian Muslim men who fled to the woods and were later captured or surrendered.
49. Thousands of Bosnian Muslim men, who fled Srebrenica and who surrendered or had been
captured, were transported from various assembly locations in and around Srebrenica to a main
assembly point at a school complex near Karakaj.
50. On or about 14 July 1995, Bosnian Serb military personnel, under the command and control of
RATKO MLADIC and RADOVAN KARADZIC, transported thousands of Muslim men from
this school complex to two locations a short distance away. At these locations, Bosnian Serb
soldiers, with the knowledge of RATKO MLADIC, summarily executed these Bosnian Muslim
detainees and buried them in mass graves.
51. RATKO MLADIC and RADOVAN KARADZIC, between about 6 July 1995 and 22 July
1995, individually and in concert with others, planned, instigated, ordered or otherwise aided and
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of the following crimes:
a) summary executions of Bosnian Muslim men and women in and around Potocari on 12 July 1995
and 13 July 1995,
b) summary executions, which occurred between 13 July 1995 and 22 July 1995, of Bosnian
Muslims who were hors de combat because of injury, surrender or capture after fleeing into the
woods towards Tuzla,
c) summary executions of Bosnian Muslim men, which occurred on or about 14 July 1995 at mass
execution sites in and around Karakaj.
By their acts and omissions in relation to the events described in paragraphs 13, 14, 20.1-20.7, 23,
26 and 28, RATKO MLADIC and RADOVAN KARADZIC committed:
Count 1: GENOCIDE as recognised by Article 4(2)(a) (killing members of the group) of the
Statute of the Tribunal.
Count 2: A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY as recognised by Article 5(b) (extermination) of the
Statute of the Tribunal.

COUNTS 3-4
(CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY)
(VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR)

52. By their acts and omissions in relation to the summary executions of Bosnian Muslim men and
women that occurred in and around Potocari between 12 July 1995 and 13 July 1995, described
heretofore in paragraph 13, RATKO MLADIC and RADOVAN KARADZIC committed:
Count 3: A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY as recognised by Article 5(a) (murder) of the Statute
of the Tribunal.
Count 4: A VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR as recognised by Article 3
(murder) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

COUNTS 5-18
(CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY)
(VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR)

53. By their acts and omissions in relation the summary executions of Bosnian Muslims who fled
Srebrenica into the woods between 13 July 1995 and 22 July 1995 as described heretofore in
paragraphs 20.1 to 20.7, RATKO MLADIC and RADOVAN KARADZIC committed:
Count 5: A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY (in relation to paragraph 20.1) as recognised by
Article 5(a) (murder) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Counts 6: A VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR (in relation to paragraph
20.1) as recognised by Article 3 (murder) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Count 7: A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY (in relation to paragraph 20.2) as recognised by
Article 5(a) (murder) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Counts 8: A VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR (in relation to paragraph
20.2) as recognised by Article 3 (murder) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Count 9: A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY (in relation to paragraph 20.3) as recognised by
Article 5(a) (murder) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Counts 10: A VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR (in relation to paragraph
20.3) as recognised by Article 3 (murder) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Count 11: A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY (in relation to paragraph 20.4) as recognised by
Article 5(a) (murder) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Counts 12: A VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR (in relation to paragraph
20.4) as recognised by Article 3 (murder) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Count 13: A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY (in relation to paragraph 20.5) as recognised by
Article 5(a) (murder) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Counts 14: A VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR (in relation to paragraph
20.5) as recognised by Article 3 (murder) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Count 15: A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY (in relation to paragraph 20.6) as recognised by
Article 5(a) (murder) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Counts 16: A VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR (in relation to paragraph
20.6) as recognised by Article 3 (murder) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Count 17: A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY (in relation to paragraph 20.7) as recognised by
Article 5(a) (murder) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Counts 18: A VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR (in relation to paragraph
20.7) as recognised by Article 3 (murder) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

COUNTS 19-20
(CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY)
(VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR)

54. By their acts and omissions in relation to the summary executions of Bosnian Muslim men at
mass execution sites in and around Karakaj, on or about 14 July 1995, as described in paragraph 28,
RATKO MLADIC and RADOVAN KARADZIC committed:
Count 19: A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY as recognised by Article 5(a) (murder) of the
Statute of the Tribunal.
Count 20: A VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR as recognised by Article
3 (murder) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
______________________
Richard J. Goldstone
Prosecutor
14 November 1995
The Hague,
The Netherlands

A TEENAGE RAPE VICTIM FROM FOCA SPEAKING…

“ … He finished raping me … and said that he could perhaps, do more … but that I was about the same age
as his daughter. ”

“Witness 50” (she testified with her name and identity withheld from the public), a teenage rape victim from Foča speaking about how ICTY convict Zoran Vuković raped her. She testified on 29 and 30 March 2000 in the case against Dragoljub Kunarac, Zoran Vuković and Radomir Kovač.

Watch the video of her testimony.

Read her story and testimony:

Witness 50 was a Muslim teenage girl from a village in the Foča municipality of southeastern Bosnia and Herzegovina when war broke out in April 1992. She was afraid that something bad would happen to her. “[A]ll the things that I was afraid of I experienced on my own skin later on,” Witness 50 told the court.

Witness 50 testified that from its first days in April 1992, the war affected life in her village. Only the Serbs were armed, she said, they saw more of the army and her neighbours wore uniforms. They could not go into town to buy basic necessities such as food or toiletries, or go to the doctor.

“ Each one of them raped the girl he wanted to rape, and as many times as he wanted to rape her. ”

At the beginning of May 1992, Witness 50 and her family began living in the woods because they were afraid that they would be burned in their homes, which she said had happened in the surrounding villages. On 3 July 1992, Witness 50’s village was attacked, and a couple of days later four uniformed soldiers, including one of her neighbours, captured them and took them to the motel at Buk Bijela.

When they arrived, Witness 50, several of her family members, and a group of women, children and two elderly men were taken to a room in barracks located around the motel. Witness 50 related how ICTY convicted Zoran Vuković, at the time a sub-commander of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) and a member of the paramilitary in Foča, who was wearing military clothing and carrying a weapon, took her to a bedroom. She told the court how Zoran Vuković forced her to have oral sex, while saying things like: “What are you afraid of? Don’t you know what sex is? Haven’t you done it before? Let’s enjoy it.” Witness 50 said she was scared and could do nothing to defend herself because he had a pistol and he threatened her.

Shortly after the first time she was raped, Witness 50 stated that she was taken to the Foča High School, where she had been a student in 1992. The day after she arrived, a group of soldiers came into the classroom and picked out about eight girls, including her. One of these soldiers took Witness 50 to a room and ordered her to lie down and take off her trousers. He raped her vaginally. Witness 50 stated in her testimony that she did not remember exactly what he said to her, but that he and all of the men who would later rape her said the same things: “You Muslim women, you Bule [derogatory term], we’ll show you.” When asked in court how she felt, Witness 50 stated: “There are no words in this world that could describe my feelings. It is the worst thing that was happening to me.”

Witness 50 was not taken out again while at the Foča High School, but she saw Serb soldiers taking other girls out, by pointing at them: “You, you or you.” She said they would take them out when they wanted to: every night some girl would end up somewhere with some soldier. Witness 50 said that when the girls came back they would all be crying, while some would be bleeding from the nose, screaming, or tearing out their hair.

“ [E]verything hurt me: my stomach, my back, my legs, everything ached. What hurt me most of all was that he was certainly some 30 years older than I was. He was probably my father’s age. ”

After 11 days, Witness 50 was taken from the Foča High School to the Partizan Sports Hall, where she was held together with some 60 people, all women and children except for two elderly men, and all Muslims. Witness 50 said that Serb soldiers went to the Partizan Sports Hall to pick out girls as well, and she told the court about a number of times they took her out and raped her. Sometimes, she said, Serb soldiers would take her out every day for three days, and then sometimes not for two days. Sometimes she would be gone for a short time, and sometimes she would be gone for three days.

Witness 50 was hiding in the bathroom a day or two after she arrived at the Partizan Sports Hall in mid-July when she was taken out for the first time. Zoran Vuković, who had raped her at Buk Bijela, sought her out and took her to an apartment and raped her. Witness 50 said that “when he finished raping me, he sat down and lit a cigarette, and he said that he could perhaps do more, much more, but that I was about the same age as his daughter, and so he wouldn’t do anything more for the moment.”

The next time Witness 50 said she was taken out of the Partizan Sports Hall to be raped, a group of Serb soldiers took her and three other girls to a house opposite the bus station in Foča. The house had been ransacked, and the soldiers first ordered them to tidy it before they raped them. “Each one of them raped the girl he wanted to rape, and as many times as he wanted to rape her.” Witness 50 stated that three different men raped her before they took her back to the Partizan Sports Hall.

After that incident, Witness 50 said another group came and took her and at least two others from the Partizan Sports Hall to an abandoned Muslim house. One solider raped her repeatedly there.

Witness 50 told the court how a man called Gica took her out of the Partizan Sports Hall to an apartment in the neighbourhood of Brod, which she thinks was his own. On the second day she was there, an acquaintance of Witness 50’s raped her. Witness 50 stated that he knew her very well. They took the same bus every day: he to go to work and she to go to school. Witness 50 stated that he was certainly 30 years older than her, and was a married man. She said that he laughed while he was raping her. “I had the feeling that he was doing this precisely because he knew me, to inflict even more evil on me.”

Another time she was taken from Partizan Sports Hall, Witness 50 said a Serb took her to his apartment, also in Brod, where he lived with his mother. He introduced Witness 50 to his mother as his Serb girlfriend, forcing her to use a Serb name, and to say that her mother and father were Serbs. They brought her brandy to drink, which she had never done before as she was not even 17 years old, and Muslim women for the most part did not drink. He then took her to his bedroom and raped her for four hours. “He was so terrible,” said Witness 50. “He did such things that I cannot even explain them. I had no place to take a bath. I couldn’t even wash my hands…”

On 2 August, ICTY convicted Dragoljub Kunarac, at the time the leader of a VRS unit, took Witness 50 and three girls out of the Partizan Sports Hall to a house in the Aladža neighbourhood. A Montenegrin soldier, who Witness 50 described as old and “awful,” took her to a room, where he threatened her with a knife, saying “You will see, you Muslim. I am going to draw a cross on your back. I’m going to baptise all of you. You’re now going to be Serbs.” Witness 50 said that he threatened her with the knife so much that she thought she would lose her life. He raped her in a “beast-like manner,” so hard that later Witness 50 saw that she was bleeding. “[E]verything hurt me: my stomach, my back, my legs, everything ached. What hurt me most of all was that he was certainly some 30 years older than I was. He was probably my father’s age.”

That night, Witness 50 was taken back to Partizan Sports Hall. Although soldiers kept coming and taking girls out, Witness 50 was not taken out again. On 13 August 1992, Witness 50 and the other detainees at the Partizan Sports Hall left Foča on buses, organised by the police. Witness 50 heard that the reason the police sent them away was that the International Red Cross Committee might be coming to Foča, and she assumes that is why they had to disappear from there.

Witness 50 testified on 29 and 30 March 2000 in the case against Dragoljub Kunarac, Zoran Vuković, and Radomir Kovač. The Tribunal convicted Zoran Vuković, a member of the  (VRS) and a member of the paramilitary in Foča, and sentenced him to 12 years’ imprisonment for raping Witness 50. The Tribunal also convicted the co-accused in this case, Dragoljub Kunarac, leader of a VRS unit, and Radomir Kovač, sub-commander of the VRS military police, and a paramilitary leader in Foča. The Tribunal sentenced them to 28 and 20 years’ imprisonment, respectively.

Read Witness 50’s full testimony.

Ratko Mladić in the Detention Unit-ICTY

ICTY “Weekly Press Briefing”

Date: 8.6.2011
Time: 12:00

Registry and Chambers:

Nerma Jelačić, Spokesperson for Registry and Chambers, made the following statement:

Good afternoon,

On Monday, the Tribunal’s President, Judge Patrick Robinson, addressed the United Nations Security Council and provided an update on the Tribunal’s work and the issues that require the Council’s full support.

According to the Completion Strategy report submitted on 18 May 2011, all ongoing trials are expected to run until 2012, with the exception of that of Radovan Karadžić which is expected to run into 2014. Half of all appeals cases are expected to run beyond 2014, with the appeals case of Radovan Karadžić possibly extending into 2018. The estimates do not include those for the trial of Ratko Mladić as yet.

Further clarification added after the Press Briefing was read out: the Tribunal will have the task of conducting and completing all trials which will be ongoing at the time of the establishment of the Residual Mechanism on 1 July 2013. The Tribunal will have competence to conduct and complete all appellate proceedings for which the notice of appeal against the judgement is filed prior to the commencement of the Residual Mechanism. Any appeals filed after 1 July 2013 will be dealt by the Residual Mechanism.  Further details can be found in the Resolution on the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT).

The President explained that the extended estimates for the completion of appeals proceedings were due to a staffing crisis within the Tribunal. The President urged the Member States to support meaningful steps to address the issue of staff attrition and help the Tribunal complete its work in the most efficient and timely manner.

The President also called on the Security Council’s assistance to establish a trust fund for the victims, which would be funded by voluntary contributions. The President considers a trust fund to be of crucial importance in complementing the work of the Tribunal and ensuring that lasting peace is achieved.

The third issue which the President raised as an area requiring the full support of the Security Council relates to the enforcement of sentences. With up to 40 additional sentences possibly having to be enforced over the next few years, depending on the outcome of proceedings, the Tribunal’s current enforcement capacity is rapidly approaching its limit. The President called on Member States to enter into enforcement agreements with the Tribunal in order to ensure that the enforcement of sentences can be secured and the Tribunal’s mission can be completed successfully.

Moving onto the courtroom schedule:

A further initial appearance in the case of Ratko Mladić has been scheduled to be held on Monday, 4 July at 10:00 in a courtroom to be determined. According to the Tribunal’s Rules, should the Accused fail to enter a plea at his further initial appearance, a plea of not guilty will be entered on his behalf. In the meantime, the Registry continues to work closely with Mladić and provide assistance with regards to the set up of his defence team, medical examinations as well as facilitation of visits.

Due to the number of journalists expected to attend the further initial appearance of Ratko Mladić, there will be an accreditation procedure, further details on which will be sent out closer to the time of the hearing.

A total of three Status Conferences will be held tomorrow, 9 June. A Status Conference will be held at 10:30, in Courtroom III, in the appeals case of Vujadin Popović and others, the seven senior Bosnian Serb Officials who were convicted in June 2010 of crimes committed in Srebrenica.

At 15:00, in Courtroom I, a Status Conference will be held in the case of Ramush Haradinaj and others. The case of the three former commanders of the Kosovo Liberation Army is currently pending partial re-trial.

The third Status Conference will be held in the contempt of court case of Jelena Rašić at 15:00 in Courtroom II. Jelena Rašić, former case manager of Milan Lukić’s Defence team, is charged with five counts of contempt of court for bribing witnesses into making false statements.

Since Monday afternoon, Trial Chamber II has been hearing the Defence case of Vojislav Šešelj in his second contempt of court case. The Prosecution case was heard on 22 February 2011. Proceedings will resume this afternoon at 14:30 in Courtroom I. Šešelj is accused of breaching protection measures ordered by the Tribunal after disclosing information about 11 protected witnesses, including their names, occupations and places of residence, in a book he authored.

Hearings in the case of Radovan Karadžić, Mićo Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin as well as Zdravko Tolimir continue this week and next as scheduled.

In the Karadžić case, the Chamber is currently hearing the testimony of Patrick Treanor, a historian who is testifying about the Bosnian Serb leadership and the Accused’s position in relation to it.

In the Stanišić and Župljanin case, Defence witness Milomir Orasanin, former inspector within the Ministry of Interior of Republika Srpska, is currently testifying.

In the case of Tolimir, the Chamber this afternoon will continue to hear the testimony of Ljubomir Mitrović, a former officer in the Republika Srpska Army and President of the Commission for Exchange of Prisoners and Bodies of the East-Bosnian Corps.

A pre-defence conference in the case of Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović has been scheduled to be held on Tuesday, 14 June at 14:15 in Courtroom II which will be followed by the start of the Defence case on Wednesday at 9:00 in the same courtroom. The Chamber will first hear the defence case of Jovica Stanišić.

Finally, please note that the Tribunal will be closed this Monday for Whit Monday.

Office of the Prosecutor:

Frederick Swinnen, special adviser to the Prosecutor, made the following statement:

Prosecutor Brammertz is to travel to Budapest next week, at the invitation of the Hungarian EU Presidency. On 15 June, Mr. Brammertz will meet with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Janos Martoniy and other senior officials of the Ministry in Budapest. The purpose is to discuss and provide an update on the cooperation of Croatia, Serbia and BiH with the OTP. This follows the submission of the report of the Prosecutor on 17 May to the UNSC and his address of 6 June to the UNSC.

Questions:

Asked how the integration of Ratko Mladić in the Detention Unit was going, Nerma Jelačić responded that, in accordance with the Tribunal’s regulations, he is still separated from the other detainees. Jelačić highlighted that he is not isolated, contrary to what some media reported. Jelačić explained that it is standard practice for an accused, upon his arrival at the Detention Unit, to spend the first week or so separated from the other detainees in a specific area of the DU where he can be monitored and undergo all medical examinations. This is a routine procedure. Jelačić added that it is anticipated that he will be moved into a residential wing of the DU very shortly, as his integration is running very smoothly.

Asked to specify when exactly he would be moved to a residential wing, Jelačić repeated that it would happen very shortly and that it is standard practice that detainees spend a week or so separated from the other detainees.

Asked to comment on the BBC report that Mladić was held in solitary confinement, Jelačić responded that the reports used inaccurate terminology.

Asked to comment on the Serbian media reports published on Monday regarding Mladić’s health and an alleged hunger strike and whether any information could be provided on the current state of his health, Jelačić responded that the media reports were inaccurate and outdated. Jelačić explained that the Registrar and officials of the Registry have met on a number of occasions with the Accused. In accordance with the Rules, the Registry is currently assisting Mladić with the set up of his defence team and also with regards to his health status. Jelačić reiterated that all proceedings have been running smoothly and that there are currently no threats regarding his health, contrary to what some media have reported. With regards to his health status, Jelačić explained that she is not in a position to provide any details and pointed out that the Accused himself, during his Initial Appearance, asked to go into private session to discuss his health issues. The Registry is still undertaking medical examinations of the Accused and conducting a variety of tests. Jelačić added that, from his appearance in court, it appears that he has neglected his health over the years and reminded that he is 69 years old. Regarding claims the he is terminally ill, Jelačić said that whilst she could not go into any details, the rule is that the doctor of the DU has a duty and obligation to inform the Registrar should there be any indications of a life-threatening situation regarding any of the accused. To date, no such situation has been reported.

Asked whether Aleksander Aleksić was still Mladić’s defence counsel and whether Mladić indicated whether he would want to chose a different counsel, Jelačić responded that Mr Aleksić was named Duty Counsel for the purpose of the Accused’s Initial Appearance as initial appearances always take place very shortly after the arrival of an accused at the Tribunal’s DU. According to Rule 62 ( c ) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, permanent counsel shall be appointed within 30 days from the day of the Initial Appearance either by the Accused himself or by the Registrar. If the Registrar is unable to appoint counsel within 30 days, he can seek an extension. Jelačić added that the Registry has been working very closely with Mladić to discuss the set up of his defence. Jelačić clarified that at this stage, Mladić has not got a permanent counsel yet.

Asked whether Mladić indicated whether he would be representing himself, Jelačić responded that the Accused has 30 days from the day of hos Initial Appearance to inform officially, in writing, the Registry on how he wants his defence team to be set up, including whether he wants to represent himself or not.

Asked whether there were any indications on what grounds his defence would be based and whether he would argue that he is mentally incapable of standing trial, Jelačić responded that it is too early to know more about the Accused’s intentions but that more might be revealed after his Further Initial Appearance on 4 July. Jelačić rejected media reports on the issue are mere speculation. Jelačić repeated that any serious medical situation or life-threatening issues would, according to the Tribunal’s rules, have to be immediately reported to the Registrar. No such reports have been made to the Registrar.

Asked when Mladić would be moved into a residential wing of the DU and whether he would share the wing with Radovan Karadžić, Jelačić responded that she was not able to respond specifically but that according to the rules, he would be moved to one of the three residential wings of the DU. The DU currently accommodates 36 other accused, so there are 12 accused per wing. Mladić will be sharing the residential area with other accused, but Jelačić said she was not in a position to provide any details as to who will be the other accused he will be sharing a wing with.

Asked how Mladić’s trial will affect the Tribunal’s Completion Strategy and the work of the Residual Mechanism, Jelačić responded that the President’s presentation to the Security Council on the latest estimates on the completion of trials did not include Mladić’s trial as it was too early to do so last Monday. The President may be able to provide estimates on Mladić’s trial during his next address either to the Security Council or General Assembly. Frederick Swinnen added that Mladić will not be tried by the Residual Mechanism as he has been arrested more than 12 months prior to the commencement of the ICTY’s Residual Mechanism.

Asked to comment on rumours that Mladić’s trial could start as early as September, Swinnen responded that it is too early to estimate when the trial might start. The Prosecution has to prepare for the trial and it is highly unlikely that it will start in September. It may take several months before it starts.

To see more on this topic, go to ITCY webiste.

Video – Justice at work (2001)

In 2001, the Outreach Programme produced a one hour documentary introducing to the work of the Tribunal.

From its inception to 2001, this documentary provides information on the circumstances surrounding the Tribunal’s establishment and an overview of its structure. From exhumations to investigations, detention, trials and judgements, it shows the wide span of tasks that were and that still are performed by Tribunal staff in the Hague and in the former Yugoslavia.

By weaving together elements that connect the Tribunal to the former Yugoslavia and to the world, Justice At Work is a rich and informative presentation of the inner workings and challenges of this important institution.

Ratko Mladic Threats (1993)

Bosnian Serb war commander “General” Ratko Mladic threatens to attack Western cities in retaliation. An indicted war criminal, arrested 26 May 2011, he was transferred to The Hague Tribunal.

This was back in 1993 when he was very confident, you should see how he’s lost his confidence now that he’s on trial! Watch the official ITCY videos of his trial.

Channel 4, 8 January 1993

“SREBRENICA: RECORD OF A WAR CRIME” book review

Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime


For those who want to find out more about the Srebrenica Genocide, this is one of the books I  recommend. There are reviews on Amazon as well…Come back and let us know what you think.

Honig and Both are Dutch foreign policy specialists who take an academic approach to the massacre of Srebrenica in Bosnia in July 1995. Their detailed accounts of UN policy debates and genocidal Serb attacks on the civilian population leading to the expulsion of over 20,000 women and children and the murder of 6,000 (this number is estimated at 8,000 + now) Bosnian Muslim men and boys clearly demonstrate the failure of the international community’s tepid approach to peace-keeping and the responsibility of the military and political leaders involved. The events also served to show the indecisive and weak-willed approach the UN and the Americans adopted in response to the crisis.
In my opinion, the book is dispassionate and slightly distanced from the moral implications of the massacre. It is indeed a “record of a war crime”, a record of Srebrenica Genocide.

Click on the book image to see all other reviews on Amazon

Check out our BOOKS ON SREBRENICA page